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The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most important components of the Internet infrastruc-
ture. DNS relies on a delegation-based architecture, where resolution of names to their IP addresses
requires resolving the names of the servers responsible for those names. The recursive structures of
the inter-dependencies that exist between name servers associated with each zone are called depen-
dency graphs. System administrators’ operational decisions have far reaching effects on the DNSs
qualities. They need to be soundly made to create a balance between the availability, security and
resilience of the system. We utilize dependency graphs to identify, detect and catalogue operational
bad smells. Our method deals with smells on a high-level of abstraction using a consistent taxonomy
and reusable vocabulary, defined by a DNS Operational Model. The method will be used to build a
diagnostic advisory tool that will detect configuration changes that might decrease the robustness or
security posture of domain names before they become into production.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) [22] is critical to the integrity of Internet services and applications.
The DNS is a distributed database for storing information on domain names, the primary namespace
for hosts on the Internet. The name space is organised in a hierarchical structure to ensure domain
name uniqueness. Each node in the DNS tree corresponds to a zone. Each zone belonging to a single
administrative authority is served by multiple authoritative name servers.
The correct and error-free operation of the DNS is crucial for the reliability of most applications
on the Internet. Operational guidelines [5, 29, 2] require that a zone have multiple authoritative name
servers, and that they be distributed through diverse network topological and geographical locations to
increase the reliability of that zone as well as improve overall network performance and access. It also
makes DNS services robust against unexpected failures. Recent work [11, 25] outlines the need for zone
operators to understand how many inter-dependencies they may inadvertently be incurring through the
deployment and sharing of DNS secondary servers.
The original DNS design focused mainly on system robustness against physical failures, and ne-
glected the impact of operational errors such as misconfigurations and bad deployment choices. Several
previous measurements [27, 16, 31] showed that zones with configuration errors suffer from reduced
availability and increased query delays up to an order of magnitude. DNS administrators have to decide
on operational parameters and be aware of their implications for the DNS’s overall system qualities. On
the deployment level, configuring the number of redundant authoritative DNS servers for a certain zone
shall take into consideration the operational overhead associated with querying multiple servers in par-
allel. Choosing servers with names under other zones provides zone redundancy but may incur security
and resiliency threats to the zone. Deciding on where to physically locate the servers should ensure a
certain degree of resistance against different types of failures. Peering with external organizations for
114 Detecting and Refactoring Operational Smells within the Domain Name System
secondary server hosting should take into consideration the impact of transitional trust and administrative
complexity [28, 15].
While the original DNS design documents [18, 22, 23, 5, 29] call for diverse placement of authorita-
tive name servers for a zone, bad configurations may lead to cyclic dependencies while bad deployment
choices may lead to diminished and false server redundancy. It was also assumed that redundant DNS
servers fail independently; previous measurements [28, 11] showed that operational deployment choices
made at individual zones can introduce excessive zone influence that severely affect the availability, se-
curity and resiliency of other zones.
This research is motivated by the lack of formal analysis of the DNS interdependencies stemming
from the delegation-based architecture as well as operational deployment choices made by system ad-
ministrators. We approached the problem from a design point of view that takes into consideration the
DNS zone configuration and server deployment choices rather than from the dynamic behavioural view
[8] which includes statistical and post-deployment measurements. We propose a method to identify,
specify and detect misconfigurations and bad deployment choices in the form of operational bad smells.
The method utilizes a set of structural metrics defined over a DNS operational model to detect the
smells in early stages of the DNS deployment. It also suggests graph-based refactoring rules as correction
mechanisms for the bad smells. We apply and validate the method using several representative case
studies. The method will be used to build a pre-emptive diagnostic advisory tool that will detect and flag
configuration changes that might decrease the robustness or security posture of a domain name, before
even the changes become into production. The contributions of this research are:
1. Introduction of the concept of operational bad smells, i.e., recurring DNS deployment bad choices
and misconfigurations that have negative impact on certain aspects of the DNS’s quality.
2. Description in detail of a set of representative operational bad smells to build a DNS operational
bad smells catalogue.
3. Identification of a set of structural metrics, defined over a DNS operational model, to query the
dependency graph of the system to detect DNS operational bad smells.
4. Suggestion of graph-based refactoring rules as correction mechanisms to eliminate the bad smells.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant background. Section 3
presents the DNS operational model. Section 4 discusses the bad smells’ identification, specification,
detection and refactoring method. Section 5 validates our method by applying it to a set of representative
case studies. Section 6 discusses some related work and Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses
future work.
2 The Operation and Structure of the DNS
DNS is responsible for the mapping of human-friendly domain names to the corresponding machine-
oriented IP addresses. Operators of each zone determine the number of authoritative name servers and
their placement and manage all changes to the zone’s data content. In spite of the fact that zone adminis-
tration is autonomous, some coordination is required to maintain the consistency of the DNS hierarchy.
2.1 General Operation of the DNS
Figure 1 shows the process by which an application looks up the domain name www.le.ac.uk and how
it is mapped to the DNS data, control and management operational planes. To find the IP address of
www.le.ac.uk, the client (e.g a web browser) submits a DNS query to a recursive DNS resolver (step
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Figure 1: An illustration of the DNS resolution process.
1). Assuming that the corresponding IP is not in the resolver cache, it will ask one of the root name
servers for the translation (step 2). The names and IP addresses of root name servers are locally stored
within each server. The root name servers will respond with a referral, telling the resolver to query
the DNS servers of the .uk domain for an answer (step 3). The resolver then repeats this process for
the .uk name servers and get a referral to ask the .ac.uk name servers which in turn answers with a
referral to as the le.ac.uk name servers (step 4 -7). The resolver next asks one of the le.ac.uk name
servers for the translation (step 8), and gets the answer in step (9), and finally forwards the answer to the
requesting client (step 10) who will use this information to connect to the web server hosting the web site
www.le.ac.uk. Throughout the process, resolvers may encounter name servers hosted under other zones
whose names need to be resolved before contacting them about the original request.
2.2 DNS Operational Inter-dependencies
Inter-dependencies are common in the DNS and stem from the hierarchal structure of the DNS, the DNS
protocol as well as from different motivations and goals [11]. A zone is said to depend on a name server
if the name server could be involved in the resolution of names in that zone. The dependencies among
name servers that directly or indirectly affect a zone are represented as a dependency graph.
Figure 2 shows the delegation graph of the zone (le.ac.uk) where the zone le.ac.uk depends on 4 au-
thoritative name servers (ns0, ns1 and ns2.le.ac.uk) under the management of the University of Leicester
(UoL), while the fourth name server (adns0.bath.ac.uk) is managed by the University of Bath. In order
to resolve any domain under the zone (le.ac.uk), resolver will ask the name servers of the root zone down
to the set of authoritative name servers of the zone. While Leicester University directly trusts bath.ac.uk
to serve its namespace, it has no control over the name servers that Bath trusts (i.e. name servers un-
der Cambridge, Salford, and Imperial College and so on). Each name server or group of name servers
are administered by different organization which creates another layer of transitive trust dependencies
amongst those organizations.
2.3 Operational Planes
The zone’s data plane is the interconnected graph of all infrastructure resource records defined within
the zone’s configuration file. The interconnected graph of all authoritative name servers involved in the
resolution process of a domain within a certain zone is called the zone’s control plane and the intercon-
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Managing Organisation(s)
Figure 2: Name Dependency Graph of (le.ac.uk).
nected graph of all administrative units involved is called the management plane. One reason that the
DNS is so powerful is that its data plane allows administrators a great deal of flexibility: they can manage
their name space however they like. However, the control and management planes’ flexibility can lead
to operational problems if not managed conscientiously.
2.4 Dependency Graphs
The recursive structures of inter-dependencies within and between the DNS operational planes is repre-
sented by dependency graph. A dependency graph [11] is a directed connected graph with a distinguished
node (r) which is the root zone. Each node in the graph represents a zone name, and each edge signi-
fies that its source is directly dependent on its target for proper resolution of itself and any descendant
domain names. Dependency graphs capture most attributes and relationships between the various opera-
tional entities within the DNS and they can be effectively utilized in detecting configuration weaknesses
and servers deployment problems. Figure 3 shows deferent dependencies that occur at the different DNS
operational planes.
Since many of the misconfigurations can’t be detected from the zone file or deployments directly,
there is a need for an operational model that encompasses all information related to the zone file and
the server deployments in one conceptual graph. The instance of the model (the dependency graph) will
enable us to detect zone integrity violations as well as violations in the deployment of name servers and
the choice of peering organizations and management structures. The conceptual graph representation
facilitates modelling at multiple levels of details simultaneously.
3 DNS Operational Model
The DNS Operational Model aims to support operational goals, such as detecting violations of the design
and deployment principles, at the authoritative level. To this end we have to search for certain patterns
indicating such violations in the instances of the operational model of the system, i.e., the dependency
graphs. This means we have to be able to specify a problem as a pattern, and to query the dependency
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graph about the existence and occurrences of the specified pattern. The model is composed of the fol-
lowing elements:
• Operational Entities (e.g. resource records, zones, servers and organizations)
• Properties of operational entities such as (in-bailiwick and out-of-bailiwick name servers)
• Relations between the entities (e.g. access attributes such as dependability, containment, delega-
tion and management)
The operational DNS entities that appear in our model fall into two categories: primitive and com-
posed entities. Composed entities have an identity and a set of properties. In addition to these, composed
entities have a list of contained entities, which are primitive or composed entities. A composed entity
type is one that contains other entities. The model supports the following composed entities: Organiza-
tion, Server, Zone and Resource Record. In order to describe a composed entity we have to specify its
properties, containment structure (i.e. the entities that it contains), relations and container entity. As an
example, we can look at the server component where it can be managed (contained) by organizations.
Multiple servers can be managed by one organization. The server can host many zone files and it has
the name and IP address as attributes. There are many types of servers and in this context we are con-
cerned with in-bailiwick servers whose name is within the zone file hosted at that particular server and
out-bailiwick servers who has a name from a zone hosted in another name server.
Three specific dependencies are present within the DNS operational planes and they are:
1. Parent Dependency: resolving the name of a domain name is always dependent on resolving its
parent name since the resolver must learn the authoritative servers for a zone from referrals from
the zones hierarchical parent.
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2. Authoritative Name Server (NS) Dependency: A zone is said to depend on a name server if the
name server could be involved in the resolution of names in that zone.
3. CNAME Aliasing Dependency (Name pointing to another Name): the resolution of an alias is al-
ways dependent on the resolution of its target CNAME. If a resolver receives a response indicating
that the name in question is an alias to another name, it must subsequently resolve the target of the
alias, and so on until an address is returned.
The dependency graph can be extracted from the zone file and from the chain of authoritative name
servers and organizations involved in the resolving process of domains under that particular zone. This
is done by analysing the zone file and the dependencies between the different resource records and their
data elements and by following the query process as outlined in Fig. 1 using certain DNS tracing tools
extensively. All types of dependencies and recursive queries are followed to get the full dependency
graph of the zone in the three operational planes.
4 Operational Bad Smells
In software engineering, bad smells in code [14] identify risks to non-functional quality in a software
system based on structural properties and metrics. We transfer these ideas to the realm of the DNS,
where operational bad smells are configuration and deployment choices by zone administrators that are
not errant or technically incorrect, and do not currently prevent the system from doing its designated
functionality. Instead, they indicate weaknesses that may impose additional overhead on DNS queries,
or increase the system vulnerability to threats, or increase the risk of failures in the future.
The set of identified bad smells is being formally specified in concise and reusable terms based on a
template that includes the bad smell name, type, inspection plane(s), description & occurrences, quality
impacts and detection strategies. The catalogue will be expanded by including refactoring rules for each
smell and how these rules have to be applied on the model instance to eliminate the concerned bad smell.
Examples of catalogue entries are shown in Table 3 and Table 5 listed as part of the case studies in
Section 5.
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Although DNS troubleshooting techniques and problem identification methods have been proposed
and several tools have been built, most of these methods and tools apply their detection techniques di-
rectly on the zone files through a predefined zone schema and integrity constraints. They don’t take into
account the inter-dependencies stemming from the hierarchical nature of the DNS or the zone admin-
istrators practices. Instead, we propose a model-based approach that subsumes all the steps necessary
to identify, specify and detect the DNS operational bad smells. The ISDR method is composed of four
stages and produces the operational bad smells catalogue:
1. Identification, including domain analysis using DNS standards in the form of Request for Com-
ments (RFCs), best practices and policy documents, literature review and DNS expert views.
2. Specification of a set of operational bad smells using a reusable vocabulary and classification of
the bad smells in a taxonomy that shows the scope of the inspection element or plane and system’s
external qualities affected by the smell.
3. Detection of bad smells in the form of general detection queries and formulas.
4. Refactoring as a correction mechanism to the operational bad smells. Other correction mechanisms
may be formulated in the form of reports or reconfiguration recommendations.
The following are the ISDR method stages in details:
4.1 Identification
The first stage in our method consists of performing deep analysis of the DNS standards, Request for
Comments (RFCs), best practices and policy documents to identify weaknesses in configuration and
deployment choices made by administrators that may impose additional overhead on DNS queries, or
increase the system vulnerability to threats, or increase the risk of cascaded failures.
4.2 Specification
The weaknesses identified in the previous step, termed as operational bad smells, are then defined using
certain key terms, unified vocabulary and reusable concepts in this domain. We developed a taxonomy
that describes the structural relationships between the various bad smells. The taxonomy has an important
role in defining the scope of inspection and highlighting the metrics or structural properties related to the
bad smell. It classifies the bad smells based on the following categories:
1. Operational plane: Data, control and management planes.
2. Affected entity types: Single type, inter-type, intra-type, or inter-zone.
3. Property of the smell: Lexical, structural or measurable.
Figure 5 shows a partial graphical representation of the DNS operational bad smells taxonomy. The
taxonomy is generic and defines a bad smell in more than one category. It can easily be extended by
defining new categories of bad smells based on subsequent iterations of the DNS operational domain
analysis. So far we have already identified 19 bad smells that can be used as a representative set that
spans the different operational planes with various detection properties.
In the context of metrics-based analysis techniques, the aforementioned classification of design enti-
ties (as explained in Section 3) has a particular relevance: it provides a pertinent explanation about why
metrics are defined and computed only for some entity types (i.e., organizations, network, server, zones
and resource records). The explanation resides basically in the distinctive aspects that exist between the
two, i.e., the fact that a composed entity can contain other entities and that it can have relations with
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Figure 5: DNS Operational Bad Smells Taxonomy.
other entities. As direct measurements are mainly counting the different entities contained in, or related
to a measured entity, it becomes obvious why the object of measurement is restricted to composed design
entities. Interesting examples of metrics are per-server and per-zone distributions such as:
1. The number of zones that are served from multiple name servers in different network autonomous
systems or diverse geographical locations (Server Redundancy).
2. The number of zones that influence the resolving of domain names within a particular zone (Zone
Influence).
For the proper interpretation of each structural metric defined over the operational model, we give
the metric definition, usability, how to measure and a formula for computing that metric. Table 1 shows
the interpretation model for the metric Administrative Complexity [11].
4.3 Detection
In order to be able to detect bad smells occurring on model instances, we need to capture deviations
of the particular instance model from the good and recommended operational best practices. Lexical
and structural properties are used to detect some of the bad smells using direct queries on the instance
model such as (Are there any cycles in the dependency graph.?).The metric-based approach combines a
set of metrics and set operators to compare them against absolute or relative threshold values. Setting
the absolute or relative operational metrics threshold values can be done using local policy constraints or
best practices from the wider DNS domain literature and expert views.
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Table 1: Interpretation of the Administrative Complexity Metric.
Metric Administrative Complexity.
Definition Describes the diversity of a zone with respect to the organisations administer-
ing its authoritative name servers.
Usability The advantage mutual hosting of zones between organizations is an increased
availability but at the same time increased potential of failure and instability of
the zone resolution process.
How to Measure Count the number of authoritative name servers of each organization involved
in the dependency graph of zone(z).
Metric Notation Oz: set of organizations administering authoritative name servers hosting zone
(z); n: total number of authoritative name servers of zone (z); NSoz : the subset
of name servers administered by organization o in Oz.
Formula Ac(z) =1- ∑no (
NSoz
NSz
)n.
4.4 Refactoring
In the area of object-oriented programming, refactoring [24] is the technique of choice for improving the
structure of existing code without changing its external behaviour. Graph-based, general refactoring rules
[7] will be suggested to remove the bad smells identified and detected in the previous stages. The general
approach of refactoring [21] is to include the following steps: (1) identify the location for refactoring, (2)
determine which refactoring rules should be applied and on what sequence, (3) guarantee that refactoring
rules are preserving the external behaviour of the system, (4) application of selected refactoring rules, (5)
assess the effect of refactoring on the systems external qualities and (6) maintain the consistency between
the refactored elements and other system artefacts.
4.5 Method Execution and Tool Support
The ISDR method is executed on a particular instance of the DNS operational model (Dependency
Graph) using the following steps:
• Step 1: Extract the dependency graph from the zone configuration file and the authoritative
servers’ deployment.
• Step 2: Query the dependency graph for any bad smell using the methods and metrics defined in
the Bad Smells Catalogue.
• Step 3: Apply relevant refactoring rule(s) on all matching occurrences of the LHS of the rule on
the instance model. A new dependency graph is generated as an output of this step.
• Step 4: New zone file(s) and authoritative name servers deployment layout can be automatically
generated from the new Dependency Graph or a set of recommendations can be presented to the
system administrator with relevant quality impacts.
The method will be implemented using a pre-emptive diagnostic advisory tool that will detect and flag
configuration changes that might decrease the robustness, resilience or security posture of a domain
name, before even the changes become into production.
5 Validation
We validate our method by applying it and its associated execution technique to several bad smells where
some of them have been already identified as misconfigurations in the literature [27, 11, 16, 15, 19].
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5.1 Case Study (1): Cyclic Dependency
To achieve acceptable geographical and network diversity, zone administrators often establish mutual
arrangement with peer organizations to host each others zone files. Authoritative name servers located in
other zones are normally identified by their names instead of their addresses and called out-of-bailiwick
name servers. A cyclic zone dependency [27] occurs when two or more zones depend on each other in a
circular way.
Table 2 shows that the zone (example.com) has 4 authoritative name servers responsible for re-
solving domain names under this zone as defined in its parent zone (.com). Two servers (ns1 and
ns2.example.com) are in-bailiwick servers and it is mandatory to include their IP addresses in the par-
ent zone in order to properly resolve domain names under that zone. The other two servers (dns1 and
dns2.example.net) are located in another zone and there is no need to include their IP addresses in the
(.com), example.com parent zone file. On the other hand, the (.net) zone which is the parent of the
(example.net) zone, is served by two out-of-bailiwick name servers located in the (example.com) zone.
Table 2: Content of Zone File for Case Study (1).
$ORIGIN .com. $ORIGIN .net.
example.com. NS ns1.example.com. example.net. NS ns1.example.com.
example.com. NS ns2.example.com. example.net. NS ns2.example.com.
example.com. NS dns1.example.net.
example.com. NS dns2.example.net.
ns1.example.com. A 1.1.1.1
ns2.example.com. A 1.1.1.2
In this example, the two zones work nicely under normal circumstances but if (for any reason), both
in-bailiwick name servers become unavailable, both example.com and example.net zones will not be
reachable because the IP Addresses of the other two authoritative name servers can’t be resolved. This
example illustrates the failure dependency between zones, where the failure of some servers in one zone
will render the other zone unreachable. The quality impacts of such a bad smell are significant reduction
on availability and resiliency of the zone against multiple points of failure.
example.com
example.net
ns1.example.com ns2.example.com
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 dns1.example.net dns2.example.net
Figure 6: Part of the Dependency Graph of Case Study (1).
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Checking each zone individually for configuration errors will not lead to the detection of this bad
smell since they are both configured correctly. On the other hand, constructing the dependency graph
will easily show the occurrence of two circular paths that identify the smell.
Table 3: Catalogue Entry for the Cyclic Dependency Bad Smell.
Name Cyclic Dependency.
Type Intra-Zone, Structural.
Inspection Planes Data and Control Planes.
Occurrences Cyclic zone dependency occurs when two or more zones
depend on each other in a circular way.
Quality Impacts Reduced availability and reduced resiliency.
Detection Strategy Is there any cycle in the Dependency Graph? (Query on
the DNS Operational Model Instance).
Correction Mecha-
nism (Refactoring)
Add a glue record for the (out-of-bailiwick) authoritative
name servers involved in the cycle in the zone file.
Z1: Zone
Z2: Zone
S1: Server
S2: Server
NS
Name
NS
Z1: Zone
S1: Server
NS
R1: RR
RRDataRRH
Owner: 
S1.name
RRType: A
DataElement: 
S1.IPAddress
LHS RHS
Figure 7: Refactoring Rule: AddGlueRecord.
Cyclic Dependencies can be eliminated by the inclusion of specific resource records (RRType: A)
for both out-of-bailiwick servers in the (.com) zone. This will enable resolving the domain names under
the (example.com) and (example.net) zones even when the two in-bailiwick servers are unreachable.
We execute this correction mechanism in the form of a graph transformation based refactoring rule
(AddGlueRecord) applied on the dependency graph as shown in Figure 7. Since we have two matches
for the LHS of the rule on the actual instantiation of the model (the dependency graph in Figure 6), then
the rule needs to be applied twice in order to remedy all occurrences of the bad smell. A new zone file
can then be automatically generated from the new Dependency Graph as shown in Table 4 or a set of
recommendations can be presented to the system administrator to eliminate the bad smell.
5.2 Case Study (2): False Redundancy
Redundancy [29] is one of two mechanisms used by DNS administrators to ensure high availability
of domain names. The level of availability provided by redundant servers is a function not only of
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Table 4: New Zone File Generated After Executing the Refactoring Rule(s).
$ORIGIN .com. $ORIGIN .net.
example.com. NS ns1.example.com. example.net. NS ns1.example.com.
example.com. NS ns2.example.com. example.net. NS ns2.example.com.
example.com. NS dns1.example.net.
example.com. NS dns2.example.net.
ns1.example.com. A 1.1.1.1
ns2.example.com. A 1.1.1.2
dns1.example.net. A 1.1.1.3
dns2.example.net. A 1.1.1.4
their number, but also of their physical location and the networks they connect to. In 2001, a DNS bad
deployment choice [10] caused many Microsoft’s web sites and email servers to be unreachable (although
they were actually still operational). All authoritative name servers for the zone (microsoft.com) were
place in one location, connected to the same network, and placed behind one particular network router.
When the router failed, this local bad choice has a large global impact by increasing the queries on one of
the DNS root servers (F server) from the normal 0.003% of all queries to over 25% [27]. The catalogue
entry for the False Redundancy bad smell is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Catalogue Entry for the False Redundancy Bad Smell.
Name False-Redundancy.
Type Measurable and Inter-zone.
Inspection Planes Control Plane.
Occurrences When all redundant servers are located within the same physical location,
connected to the same network, placed within the same address prefix.
Quality Impacts Reduced availability, decreased resilience, and the system become suscep-
tible to single point of failure at certain granularity.
Detection Queries on the dependency graph regarding the following metrics: a) num-
ber of authoritative name servers, b) geographical locations servers are
placed in, c) networks connected to, and d) BGP prefixes,
Refactoring Applying the MoveServerLocation refactoring rule will ensure the avail-
ability of the zone and its resilience to a single point of failure.
In this example, we are looking into one aspect of False Redundancy, which is the geographical
placement of the authoritative name servers. Looking at the dependency graph extracted from the zone
file, generated as an output of case study (1) and the deployment of authoritative name servers, as shown
in Figure 8, it is clear that the geographical redundancy of the zone (example.com) is one which is much
less than the server’s Redundancy which is supposed to be 4 (the total number of authoritative name
servers defined in the zone). Looking at the IP address associated with each of these servers, it is evident
that all of them are connected to the same network, and behind even the same router. This deployment
choice introduces a single point of failure since all servers are located in the same geographical area and
this badly affect the resiliency and availability of the zone and its domain names. Geographical area may
be defined as a continent, country, city or even a certain building, which may also be susceptible to power
outage, natural disaster or any other risk.
In order to detect the occurrence of the False Redundancy bad smell, one set of queries regarding the
number of authoritative name servers of the particular zone, number of distinct geographical locations
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example.com
Geolocation
[City (X)]
dns1.example.net
1.1.1.3
dns2.example.net
1.1.1.4
ns2.example.com
1.1.1.2
ns1.example.com
1.1.1.1
Figure 8: Geographical Location Dependency Graph of Case Study (2).
where those servers are placed in, can be executed against the dependency graph in Figure 8. The resulted
measurements are used in detecting the bad smell as defined in its catalogue entry. The threshold values
for the metrics are set based on the best practices and policies as identified in the first step of the ISDR
method or can be left to the system administrator to set based on the local policies and operational
requirements.
LHS RHSNAC
Z1: Zone
server
G2: Geo
NS
Z1: Zone
G1: Geo
NS
G2: Geo
NS
S1: Server S2: Server
G1: Geo G2: Geo
Z1: Zone
NS NS
S1: Server S2: Server
Figure 9: Refactoring Rule: MoveServerLocation.
It should be noted that the refactoring rule shown in Figure 9 is just one of the options to eliminate
this bad smell, i.e., there could be another rule for creating a new server in a new location rather than
moving an existing one. We can look at network number or BGP prefix instead of location. It can also
take more than one rule application to resolve the situation, so a single rule specifies an incremental
improvement, which may have to be repeated or combined with others.
6 Related Work
6.1 DNS Interdependencies and Misconfigurations
Ramasubramanian, et al. [28] demonstrate the far-reaching effects of DNS dependencies. Their results
show that a domain name relies on 44 name servers on average. Deccio et al. [11] perform further ex-
amination of name resolution behaviors to create a formal model of name dependencies in the DNS and
quantify the significance of such dependencies. Several surveys of production DNS deployments have
been conducted [27, 16, 31] with various misconfigurations are analyzed. So far the main efforts in ad-
dressing the problem have focused on informing the operators about the existence of DNS configuration
errors, either by Internet RFCs [5, 29] or with directives set by specific organizations [2].
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6.2 DNS Troubleshooting
Although several DNS troubleshooting techniques and problem identification methods [26, 12] have
been proposed and several tools [1, 13, 30] have been built, most of these methods and tools apply their
detection techniques directly on the zone files through a predefined zone schema and a specified set of
integrity constraints. Chandramouli and Rose [9] considered integrity constraints for Resource Records
(RRs) from single and multiple zones. They found that many integrity constraints have to be satisfied
across zones. [8] proposed a set of metrics to be used to evaluate the health of the DNS by measuring
the DNS along three dimensions, namely vulnerability, security and resilience. Most of these studies
can detect only a subset of the DNS infrastructure-related configuration errors. On the other hand, they
implement diagnostic tests that can identify errors related with application-specific resource records.
They do not take into account the inter-dependencies stemming from the hierarchical nature of the DNS,
zone administrators’ practices and deployment choices.
Despite all the existing efforts, DNS configuration errors are still widespread today [19], and one of
the main reasons is the lack of adequate tools to help DNS operator identify and correct configuration
errors in their own domains. Previous studies are largely based on empirical analysis, whereas in this pa-
per we derive a formal operational model and methodology to systematically identify misconfigurations
and bad deployment choices in the form of operational bad smells.
6.3 Bad Smells and Refactoring
There is a large body of work on the identification of problems in software, database and networks. Sev-
eral books have been written on smells [14] in the context of object-oriented programming. Marinescu
[20] presented a metric-based approach to detect code smells. Alikacem and Sahrouri [3] proposed a lan-
guage to detect violations of quality principles and smells in object-oriented systems. Mens and Tourwe
[21] have conducted a comprehensive survey of software refactoring. While software refactoring has
started focusing on restructuring of programs, the research has extended to model refactoring [6].
Our objectives are similar to those of previous DNS operation studies but our approach differs. Our
method utilizes a set of measurable, structural and lexical properties defined over a DNS operational
model to detect the smells in early stages of the DNS deployment. It also suggests graph-based refactor-
ing rules as correction mechanisms for those bad smells.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Currently, there is little consensus on the right measures and acceptable performance levels for the DNS
as a whole related to availability, security, stability and resiliency. Individual operators and independent
researchers have measured various aspects of the DNS, but to date little progress has been made in
defining and implementing standard, system-wide metrics or acceptable service levels. Efforts to improve
risk management related to DNS security, stability and resiliency must be guided by an improved ability
to measure these characteristics and assess the utility of programs and resources investments. A key
enabler of improving this situation will be to ensure that composite parts of DNS operations are correctly
configured, deployed, instrumented and measured.
The method presented in this paper will lay the basis for developing a visual advisory tool for system
administrators to analyse, discover, and remedy operational bad smells. The diagnostic tool will consider
several properties and metrics from the DNS operational model presented in this research in relation to
the domain name whose zone is being modified. The tool, in a systematic process, can automatically
direct the zone administrator to places in the zone file that contain potential design and deployment
problems that may compromise availability, resiliency or security of a domain name before the changes
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become into production. Zone administrator will be able to run several scenarios and apply several
refactoring rules through the tool to determine the solution that best meets their local policies.
The tool is being designed to cope with zones with very large size and need to be fast enough to
be practically applicable. A set of consistent refactoring steps will be applied (or recommended) as
graph transformation rules using available tools and techniques. The rule-based behaviour preservation
[7] will be verified to make sure the suggested rules preserve the system functionality and improve its
external qualities. Execution of the refactoring rules may introduce complex sequence of operations to
transform the model changes into physical resources relocation. In order to implement some of these
refactoring rules, we need to take into consideration access control permissions and physical access to,
or coordination actions such as service level agreements (SLAs), with external sites. These concerns
will be tackled as part of the refactoring execution steps and available techniques and tools [4] are being
currently investigated.
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